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One’s-Self I Sing 
 
 
ONE’S-SELF I sing—a simple, separate Person; 
Yet utter the word Democratic, the word En-masse. 
 
Of Physiology from top to toe I sing; 
Not physiognomy alone, nor brain alone is worthy for the muse—I say the Form complete is worthier far; 
The Female equally with the male I sing. 
 
Of Life immense in passion, pulse, and power, 
Cheerful—for freest action form’d, under the laws divine, 
The Modern Man I sing. 
 
 
 
 
Walt Whitman 
Leaves of Grass 
1900 
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1 Introduction 
Since 1948 the field of human rights has been growing increasingly powerful and 
influential in international relations.  It has emerged as an indispensable framework for 
national, international, and transnational actions and policies.1 Concurrently, the cultivation 
and spread of democracy has risen to a standard area of discourse and policy in 
international relations.  Despite an international pro-democracy movement,2 the definition 
of democracy as a political system remains fragmented and ambiguous.3  The human rights 
field, in its increasing strength and importance, has the potential to be a critical tool in the 
clarification and legitimization of the international democratic movement.  
 
Democracy and human rights are both founded on, and aim to protect the value and dignity 
of the human person. Democratic theory and systems of democracy secure legitimacy and 
build sovereignty from this grounding in inherent dignity. Human rights theory and the 
human rights system also derive power and legitimacy from the inherent dignity of the 
person, and in doing this reformulate the legitimacy of State sovereignty. When these two 
conceptions or systems work in tandem the concept of human dignity serves to both build 
government and check government. It is this dynamism which is the main thread of this 
discussion. 
1.1 Research Aim 
Largely bypassing the philosophical arguments concerning the core definition of 
“democracy” the second, third, and fourth chapters locate human rights norms and trends 
which correlate4 with democratic principles and which structure the practical boundaries of 
a common, perhaps even universal, definition of democratic government. These chapters 
will use human rights law to construct an understanding of a democratic political system 
which is morally and logically consistent with existing law and with supranational 
                                                 
1 Forsythe (2006)  
2 Franck (2000) p.27 
3 OHCHR Democracy: Challenges and opportunities 
4 “Correlation” requires that the concepts have the same founding principles and generally operate in the same 
framework along the same rules of behaviour. 
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objectives. In these chapters codified human rights are used in an effort to expose what is 
already imbedded5 in the law itself. 
 
Chapter five reviews and concludes the previous chapters. It extracts the main points of the 
previous chapters and puts them into context with some of the current debates concerning 
democracy. This section addresses how human rights improve the discourse of, and 
subsequently the policies of, an international democratic requirement. 
 
Chapters six and seven will explore the country situations of the United States and Norway. 
It will provide a short overview of the political and legal influences in relation to country-
specific notions of democracy and country-specific notions of human rights.  The studies 
will investigate the convergence or divergence of democracy and the international human 
rights regime in the practical sense; they will pay particular attention to issues concerning 
ratification and subsequent implementation legislation as well as national conceptions of 
democratic decision-making. 
 
Chapter eight is the conclusion of the thesis. It will review the discussion in chapter five 
and will draw out the core findings of chapters six and seven. The first part of the thesis 
will argue that a human-rights-based approach to democratization is the most valid and 
cohesive approach to a universal understanding of democracy. Being so, it is also the most 
comprehensive approach to a right to democracy and/or a democratic entitlement. The 
country studies however help to illuminate a fundamental tension between democracy, a 
process which derives its legitimacy from the bottom-up of the power hierarchy, and 
human rights, which despite being grounded in inherent dignity, is perceived to be at odds 
with this bottom-up structure. What we find then is that democracy needs a comprehensive 
definition that derives a good deal of its power and legitimacy from an expansive realm 
human rights. However, to promote democracy we must be aware of the cracks in the 
                                                 
5 In this context, the word “imbedded” is used in the sense that it is not necessarily the explicit focus or aim of 
the law, but is an existing element of the law. 
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conceptual molding and understand the practical ways that these cracks can be plastered 
over, this will be discussed in reference to the country study of Norway.  
 
1.1.1 Scope 
Several concessions must be made to accommodate considerations of available time and 
word-count.  The discussion of democratic theory will be quite brief and Robert A. Dahl 
will be the main theorist drawn from to present the basic outlines of the concept of 
democracy. Dahl’s work has been chosen because it is a very clear and logical approach to 
a theory of what a modern democracy requires. I will also be making specific and repeated 
reference to Thomas Franck due to his pivotal work in the area of an emerging right to 
democratic governance. 
 
Unfortunately, reference to international human rights instruments will be limited to the 
ICCPR and the ECHR. Both Conventions deal largely with the same rights and are part of 
the two most developed human rights systems (the UN and the CoE). The work will draw 
on the Conventions themselves as well as the work of these standard-setting human rights 
systems (general comments, court cases, recommendations etc). The countries in the 
country studies are both parties to the ICCPR, only Norway is party to the ECHR but the 
US has observer status in the CoE.  The OSCE will also be used as a source because of its 
groundbreaking work in this area and because both countries are members.  
 
This paper is not meant to be a prescription for democratic governance or a complete 
prescription for the direction democratization should take. Neither is the paper a 
comprehensive critique of the policies and laws of the United States or of Norway. It is also 
outside the scope of this paper to address how democracy compares and contrasts with 
other systems of political governance. The aim of the paper is to address the broad concepts 
of democracy in relation to specific legal norms and comment (in an admittedly limited 
way) on the general issues related to the understanding of the legitimacy of democracy in 
relation to issues of sovereignty and international human rights obligations. 
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1.2 Methodology 
1.2.1 Methodology for Chapters 2-5: To Structure Democracy 
The first major issue to be addressed is how democratic theory and democratic governance 
relate to human rights law.  Linkages will be established by drawing on human rights 
instruments and interpretation of these instruments from both case-law and from expert 
analysis.  The most advantageous legal methodological approach to these sources is 
through a law-as-process method taken from Rosalyn Higgins’ work. 
 
The law-as-process method sees law as; 
…decisions [that] are made by authorized persons or organs, in 
appropriate forums, within the framework of certain established practices 
and norms, [this constitutes] legal decision-making.  In other words, 
international law is a continuing process of authoritative decisions.  This 
view rejects the notion of law merely as the impartial application of rules.  
International law is the entire decision-making process, and not just the 
reference to the trend of past decisions which are termed ‘rules’.6 
This theory argues a wider scope of authoritative influence over legality than a positivist 
view and will set the stage nicely for a discussion on how political theory may influence 
legality.   
 
Art.38 of the ICJ Statute establishes the hierarchy of applicable sources of legal 
interpretation putting judicial decisions and scholarly publications at the bottom, coming 
after international conventions, international customs, and general principles of law. There 
is nothing in this equation that precludes the emergence of a new norm; it is possible and 
probable that some judicial decisions and scholarly work will bolster a norm into the realm 
of a general principle of law. This is especially true if such a norm can be tied to the object 
and purpose of the convention in question.7 As Alan Boyle has pointed out, soft law can 
have a very potent role in the corpus of international law as a  
… [vehicle] for focusing consensus on rules and principles, and for 
mobilizing a consistent, general response on the part of States. Depending 
                                                 
6 Higgins (1994) p.2 
7 ”A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” VCLT Art.31.1 
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upon what is involved, treaties may be more effective than soft law 
instruments for this purpose…but the assumption that they are necessarily 
more authoritative is misplaced.8 
Soft law plays a facilitating role to an evolutionary understanding and 
development of hard law and may be “…the first step in a process eventually 
leading to conclusion of a multilateral treaty.”9 The various documents from the 
human rights regimes of the UN and the CoE as well as the OSCE, and 
subsequent scholarly interpretation of these regimes are to be considered, in this 
circumstance, as strong indications of the content of State obligations as well as 
the direction in which State obligations may be headed.  
 
Law-as-process takes soft law into consideration as well as the inevitable element of choice 
in legal decision-making.10  Decision-making permeates all aspects of law from the first 
creation of a legal text to the final application as law and as precedent.  Persons in positions 
of authority interact with the law in ways which reflect their understanding of the law, and 
their understanding is built partially on social contexts.11  When choices are made, “…one 
must inevitably have consideration for the humanitarian, moral, and social purposes of the 
law.”12 
 
Law-as-process then, suggests a feasible framework for acknowledging an implicit right. If 
law, by its nature, cannot be distinguished from the understanding or application of it, then 
with shifting political concerns the discussion of a right to democracy will not necessarily 
require the creation of a new norm, but rather it will locate the basis of that norm in applied 
law and extract its content through active policy decisions. The non-hard law, the 
interpretations and applications of the law, can be used to alter or illuminate the meaning or 
content of the obligation.  
 
                                                 
8 Boyle (2006)  p.145 
9 Boyle (2006) p.145 
10 Higgins (1994) p.5 
11 Higgins (1994) p.5 
12 Higgins (1994) p.5 
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Finally, the law-as-process methodology eliminates the distinction between lex lata and lex 
ferenda.13  The theory posits that the distinction between the two fades because, “…law as 
process encourages interpretation and choice that is more compatible with values we seek 
to promote and objectives we seek to achieve.”14  In this way, the wilful act of arguing or 
of making decisions based on a composite right not clearly dictated in codified texts is in 
fact both law as it is and law as it should be.  
1.2.2 Methodology for Chapters 6-8: The Demeanor and Role of Democracy 
The second main part of the thesis concerns the country studies of the US and Norway.    It 
assesses the way in which the countries themselves characterize the relationship between 
their democratic system and international human rights law, country-specific conceptions 
of human rights, and the perceived appropriate methods of implementation of human rights 
norms in a democratic society. This section will approach the subject from a comparative 
approach; the analysis will include political analysis as well as legal analysis. In an effort to 
investigate how each nation’s self-perception is reflected in both democracy and in that 
country’s specific approach to international law, these chapters will draw on political 
jurisprudence theory (also referred to as judicialization).15 Political jurisprudence explores 
the connection between political actors and political forces, and law-based actors (lawyers, 
judges etc) and law-based forces; “[i]ts foundation is the sociological jurist’s premise that 
law must be understood not as an independent organism but as an integral part of the social 
system.”16 In this analysis judges are seen not only as interpreters of the law, but 
secondarily as makers of the law.17 These chapters will focus on the relationship between 
law and politics and the perceived tensions between the two in specific reference to 
                                                 
13 Higgins (1994) p.10 
14 Higgins (1994) p.10 
15 Shapiro (2002)  
16 Shapiro (2002) p.19 
17 Sweet (2002) p.69: “Even when judicial and legislative functions are separated, comparative institutional 
advantage produces legislative-judicial interdependence. The law-maker makes rules whose reach, among 
others things, is immediately general and prospective; the judge makes rules whose reach, among other things, 
is immediately particular and retrospective. If the judge is expected to enforce the law-maker’s law, and if this 
law is meant to be binding, coercive [triadic dispute resolution] is required. If…[triadic dispute resolution] 
results in rule-making, then compulsory [triadic dispute resolution] results in the authoritative reconstruction 
of the law-makers law. The legislator therefore shares rule-making power with the judge.”  
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democracy. The comparative aspect of this approach will investigate the differences 
between the two countries in terms of political self-conceptions manifesting themselves 
through a connection with democracy; the similarities in the study have to do with the basic 
concepts of democracy rather than particular national perceptions.  
 
1.3 Premise: Sovereignty and Legitimacy 
Sovereignty is a tricky concept, though it is one that plays perhaps the most critical and 
influential role in international relations. Stephen Krasner separates sovereignty into four 
different forms: domestic sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, international legal 
sovereignty, and Westphalian sovereignty.18 The third and fourth types of sovereignty are 
where the tension between democratic decision-making and international human rights law 
is located. International legal sovereignty deals with what establishes “…the status of a 
political entity in the international system.”19 Westphalian sovereignty, or the classic 
understanding of sovereignty, is “…based on two principles: territoriality and the exclusion 
of external actors from domestic authority structures.”20  
 
It is understood that when States become parties to human rights conventions they accept 
the premise that they have certain responsibilities to their citizens (or to those within their 
jurisdiction). International norms, deriving their premise from universal values and exerting 
themselves within the framework of statehood, directly affect sovereignty by positing a 
broadened social definition of legitimate state-citizen relations. In being voluntary 
commitments21 these obligations are invited by States and so are not a violation of, or 
infringement on, international legal sovereignty: “Invitation occurs when a rule voluntarily 
compromises the domestic autonomy of his or her own polity. Free choices are never 
inconsistent with international legal sovereignty.”22 However, such commitments do 
violate the Westphalian model of sovereignty to which States have seemed to be so 
                                                 
18 Krasner (2000) 
19 Krasner (2000) p.576 
20 Krasner (2000) p.576 
21 Customary international norms and preemptive norms will not be addressed due to the scope of this thesis. 
22 Krasner (2000) p.576 
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attached.23 When the concept of democracy is broadened beyond Westphalian boundaries 
into the international legal realm, the invitation of international standards positions the two 
types of sovereignty against one another in a particularly tense relationship. What emerges 
from this positioning is a complicated and precarious balancing of legitimacies.  
 
The international community has begun a process leading to a requirement of democratic 
governance as a precondition for international legal sovereignty.24 If the fundamental 
aspects of democracy can be found in previously codified human rights conventions, then 
States have already invited these standards upon themselves and have legitimately limited 
their own sovereignty as far as the international legal sovereignty is concerned. However, 
as far as Westphalian sovereignty is concerned, and especially in the case of democratic 
governance which positions the role of the citizen as the basis and functionary of legitimate 
governance, invitation of interference is not a legitimate source of influence over the 
requirements of a sovereign State. Democracy is a particularly thorny concept in 
international relations being both an implicit part of international requirements and a 
system of governance which bolsters conceptions of Westphalian-like sovereignty.  
 
The ensuing chapters will attempt to construct an international human-rights-based 
democratic requirement, then they will explore specific country situations which are 
wrestling with the nature of this understanding in light of State sovereignty issues. What we 
eventually find is that sovereignty softens under the pressures of its discursive aspects. The 
international community has much to gain from slowly eroding the last standing defenders 
of Westphalian-like democracy, and international human rights law is a key tool in this 
effort. Sovereignty itself doesn’t erode but rather is inching toward a broader formula 
guided by international legal requirements.  
                                                 
23 Krasner (2000) p.577: “Regardless of the motivation or the perspicacity of rulers, invitations violate 
Westphalian sovereignty by subjecting internal authority structures to external constraints.”  
24 Franck (2000); Democratic Governance and International Law (2000) 
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2 What is democracy and where can it be found? 
2.1 Core Concepts 
There are many political theories concerning democracy and democratic rights; whittling 
the definition down to a few core concepts will serve as a baseline for future arguments. 
Such a definition helps to clarify the discourse concerning democracy while also clearing a 
path for a consistent theory of the acceptable means and ends of an international 
democratic requirement.  
 
A discussion of direct-democracy, though perhaps having some teleological merit, is not 
practically applicable to the notion of an implicit right to democracy. The contemporary 
understanding of democracy is broader and more various than direct-democracy and so this 
particular work will concentrate on a theory of democracy/democratic governance which is 
more practically applicable to current trends and debates without stretching the definition 
too far into new or radical areas.  Robert A. Dahl’s work fits well into this happy medium, 
taking its direct cue from the basis that a democratic function is meant to allow “ordinary 
citizens [to] exert a relatively high degree of control over [their] leaders.”25   
 
If the basic precepts of democracy can be found in human rights law, and considering to 
what extent they can be found, there may be an implicit human right to democracy.  This 
chapter, “What is democracy and where can it be found?,” attempts to locate the core 
principles of democracy within the existing human rights Conventions.26 
2.1.1 Democratic Premise 
Dahl’s work clearly outlines the theoretical precepts of democracy.  He asserts that 
democracy is predicated on the notion that all persons are to be considered “politically 
equal”:27 “Among adults no persons are so definitely better qualified than others to govern 
that they should be entrusted with complete and final authority over the government of the 
                                                 
25 Dahl (2006) p.3 
26 only referencing the ICCPR and ECHR 
27 Dahl (1998) p.37 
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state.”28 This argument is one of intrinsic equality 29which speaks not to the status of the 
personal functions of individuals (as we can all see the actual inequalities that exist 
amongst various people) but is a moral argument that persons have intrinsically equal 
claims to certain goods.  Dahl uses life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness as an example 
of this claim; in doing this he is quite clearly invoking the idea of natural rights which 
translate into modern human rights.30     
 
The political philosopher John Locke argued that governments which violate the natural 
God-given rights of the people loose their authority to rule, and inevitably the people will 
resist such oppression. Human rights are the descendent of Locke’s theory of natural 
rights.31  The UDHR preamble duplicates Locke’s assertion (without a reference to 
“God”): the “…inherent dignity of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family” is the “foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world” and it goes 
on to suggest that citizens may have the right to rebel against a government which does not 
ensure the protection of human rights.32  Art.1 UDHR solidifies this further, while carefully 
avoiding the concept of divine endowment, in stating that “[a]ll human being are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights.  They are endowed with reason and conscience and should 
act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”  It is from this foundation of the 
inherent dignity of humankind which all human rights documents are subsequently based 
and all human rights defenders claim as their maxim. 
 
Thus Dahl’s premise of political equality stemming from intrinsic equality (inherent 
dignity), coupled with the assertion that governments that violate natural rights (human 
rights) are widely considered oppressive and therefore rightfully at risk of a 
                                                 
28 Dahl (1998) p.75   
29 Dahl (1198) p.65 
30 This lineage is complicated and nuanced, see Freeman (2002) for more information. 
31 Freeman (2002) p.21-22 
32 UDHR Preamble §1 
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rebellion/overthrow, together suggest that democracies may be the only legitimate 
governments when seen through the lens of human rights.33  
 
2.1.2 Self-Determination as a Foundation 
Dahl does not specifically address the concept of self-determination, but it is the bedrock 
principle of the UN system of human rights and is the enumeration of the aforementioned 
premise that participation is the natural outgrowth of inherent/intrinsic dignity/equality.  
The right to self-determination is codified in Art.1 of the ICCPR.34  The crux of this article 
is that all peoples have the right to “determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.”35   
 
Self-determination has two dimensions. The first is external self-determination (ESD) 
which is highly contentious in the political realm.  The HRC-GC-12 does not go very far in 
addressing the issue and the HRC cannot accept individual complaints concerning the 
provision because it is deemed a collective right rather than an individual right. CERD-GR-
21 however, aptly addresses the content of ESD.36  ESD originally addressed situations 
resulting from imperialism, colonialism, the break-up of the USSR, and continues to 
currently address conflicts concerning the territorial integrity of States.  Because ESD is 
clearly is threatening to States in regards to territorial sovereignty, CERD-GR-21 sets 
moderating boundaries:  
In [the] view of the Committee international law has not recognised a 
general right of peoples to unilaterally declare secession from a state.  In 
this respect, the Committee…[notes] that a fragmentation of States may be 
detrimental to the protection of human rights as well as to the preservation 
                                                 
33 Moscow Document (1991) Art.17.2: “[The Participating States of the OSCE] will support vigorously, in 
accordance with the Charter of the Untied Nations, in case of overthrow or attempted overthrow of a 
legitimately elected government of a participating State by undemocratic means, the legitimate organs of that 
State upholding human rights, democracy and the rule of law, recognizing their common commitment to 
countering any attempt to curb these basic values…” 
34 as well as Art.1CESCR, making it “common Art.1” 
35 ICCPR Art.1.1 
36 Though CERD is mildly out of the scope of this paper, HRC-GC-12 is very weak in nature and it is 
common in human rights literature that CERD-GR-21 is called upon as a source of clarification. 
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of peace and security.  This does not, however, exclude the possibility of 
arrangements reached by free agreements of all parties concerned.37 
This condition reaffirms the primacy of sovereignty in international law over the direct will 
of the people and reminds the beneficiary that human rights are secured within a system of 
law that has definitive boundaries of applicability and that these boundaries are national.  
However, the situations in which ESD can validly apply may be even more telling: 
It is contended that a people is entitled to ESD, by way of secession, when 
it lives under colonial or neo-colonial domination, or when it is so 
severely persecuted, and its human rights so systematically abused, that 
ESD is necessary to remedy such abuse, and preserve its long-term 
viability as a people.38 
This condition of ESD reaffirms the relationship of State sovereignty to the protection of 
human rights and the inverse relationship of human rights to the maintenance and security 
of State sovereignty. 
 
The other dimension of common Art.1 is internal self-determination (ISD).  This is one of 
the strongest and most explicit claims to democracy in the ICCPR in that it is widely 
interpreted as affirming democracy on a collective level.39  Most notably the HRC  
…identifies as the beneficiaries of self-determination the people of 
existing states.  It equates their right of self-determination with the 
existence within the State of a continuing system of democratic 
government based on public participation.  It denies that self-
determination involves a right to secede. 40 
There has been no case-law concerning Art.1 directly.  However, the HRC has found it 
relevant to consider Art.1 ISD as a component of possible violations of other articles; it 
states in Gillot et al. v. France that: 
Although the Committee does not have the competence under the Optional 
Protocol to consider a communication alleging violation of the right to 
self-determination protected in article 1 of the Covenant, it may interpret 
article 1, when this is relevant, in determining whether rights protected in 
parts II and III of the Covenant have been violated.  The Committee is of 
the view, therefore, that, in this case, it may take article 1 into account in 
interpretation of article 25 of the Covenant.41 
                                                 
37 CERD-GR-21 §6 
38 Joseph (2004) p.149 
39 Crawford (2000) p.94 
40 Crawford (2000) p.95 
41 Gillot et al. v. France §13.4 
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This connection to Art.25 is notable in that it links the political dimension42 of self-
determination directly to voting rights.  Self-determination is the basis for human rights in 
the UN system; through this, human rights documents assert the sovereignty of peoples in 
relation to the sovereignty of the nation-state. 43  When this is combined with voting rights 
(which will be discussed more later), the literature and concept of human rights seems to 
implicitly suggest that sovereignty is tied to democracy. 44 Europe, interestingly, does not 
proclaim a right to self-determination.  It seems that the CoE’s prerequisite of democracy45 
perhaps makes a right to self-determination superfluous and maybe even too abstract for 
the Council’s purposes.    
2.2 Core Standards of Democracy 
Dahl sets out five standards for the democratic process stemming from the premise of 
political equality; these shall be considered the core standards of democracy.46 These 
standards are effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of 
the agenda, and inclusion of adults.  The first of these, effective participation,47 is 
necessary to ensure that each individual has the opportunity have his/her views represented, 
“[t]he principle of equality requires not only that people’s interests should be attended to 
equally by government policy, but also that their views should count equally.”48  
2.2.1 Effective Participation: Freedom of Speech 
Effective participation is expressed in human rights partially through the codification of 
freedom of speech (to hold an opinion etc.) in Art.10 ECHR, and Art.19 ICCPR.  The 
                                                 
42 Hanski (2003) p.414 
43 Reisman (2000) p.251: “In modern international law, what counts is the sovereignty of the people and not a 
metaphysical abstraction called the State.” 
44 HRC GC-25-§1+3 
45 ECHR Preamble §4: “Reaffirming their profound belief in those fundamental freedoms which are the 
foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand by an effective political 
democracy and on the other by a common understanding and observance of the human rights upon which 
they depend.” 
46 Dahl (1998) p.38 
47 Though generally out of scope, it is important to mention that the effectiveness of participation is most 
developed in the area of indigenous and minority rights.  Indigenous rights require, in some cases, 
participation in “the formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans and programmes” which affect the 
people directly (ILO-169 Art.7.1); see also p.19 below 
48 Beetham (1995) p.3 
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articles are similarly formulated (including the mention of duties and responsibilities), and 
both articles accept that the State can limit the freedom under certain conditions.  The most 
noteworthy difference between the two articles for this discussion is the textual 
consideration of a “democratic society.”   
 
2.2.1.1 Freedom of Speech: ECHR 
Art.10 of the ECHR contains the core of the right, while 10.2 sets the equation for 
acceptable limitations.  It requires that restrictions be prescribed by law and are instituted in 
the service of a pressing social need that corresponds to the list of needs set out in the 
article.  Encompassing these needs is the higher requirement that any limitation on the right 
should be “necessary in a democratic society.”  This requirement runs through the 
acceptable limitation clauses of Arts.8-11 of the Convention.  Noting that the Convention is 
directly descended from, and a component of, the CoE of which democracy is one of the 
three pillars, this requirement presupposes that the State Party is a democracy.  The 
restriction suggests that democratic governments require specialized consideration 
concerning limitations on human rights and so State obligations are considered through this 
paradigm. It is made clear through European case law that the Court’s view of freedom of 
expression is constructed in direct reference to its value for a democratic society: “… 
[freedom of expression] constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic 
society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every 
man.”49 The Court’s due regard to necessity in a democratic society partially constructs the 
width of the margin of appreciation afforded to the State party; if a certain speech concern 
can be shown to contribute to “social and political debate, criticism and information” the 
State’s margin narrows more so than if the speech is more of an “[a]rtistic and commercial 
expression.”50  
 
                                                 
49 Handyside v. UK §48) 
50 Ovey (2006) p.320 
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2.2.1.2 Freedom of Speech: ICCPR 
Art.19 of the ICCPR sets out similar acceptable reasons for limiting the freedom of speech 
as well as also requiring that such limitations be prescribed by law.  There is a requirement 
that all limitations prove “necessary” for the State party, but it does not presuppose a 
democratic society.  Rather, the necessity of the restriction is linked to the acceptable aims 
of the restriction listed in the article as well as to the proportionality principle.51  
 
2.2.1.3 Freedom of Speech: Summing up 
Despite the differing textual reference to democracy, the case law generally shows that 
there is not much difference between the proportionality as measured by the HRC 
concerning the legitimate aims and the specific consideration of a democratic society in the 
ECHR.  There is little difference in the understanding of the right to freedom of expression 
and in the understanding of its application. Freedom of expression can then be said to be 
supported in both Conventions without being overly affected by the express reference to 
democratic governance. 
2.2.2 Effective Participation: Assembly and Association 
The second aspect of effective participation from a human rights perspective is freedom of 
association.  In a large democracy it is necessary and prudent to form organizations and 
political parties that solidify and promote the viewpoint of individuals.  These 
organizations serve as an intermediary between the individuals and the State.  Both the 
ICCPR and the ECHR have rights that protect assembly and association.52   
2.2.2.1 Freedom of Assembly and Association: ECHR 
Art.11 ECHR contains the same condition of “necessary in a democratic society” that has 
been discussed above.  In the European case law, it seems that the Court has defacto 
                                                 
51 HRC-GC-10; Siracusa Principles Art.11; Nowak (2003) p.61; Nowak (2005) p.426: “The requirement of 
necessity implies that the restriction must be proportional in severity and intensity to the purpose being 
sought and may not become the rule…the relevant criterion for evaluating whether interference is necessary 
is not a common, democratic minimum standard but rather solely whether it was proportional in the given 
case.” 
52 Art.21 & 22 ICCPR; Art.11 ECHR 
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divided applications concerning Art.11 into two categories.53  The first category concerns 
“…‘political’ or ‘democratic’ rights—such as the freedom to take part in a demonstration 
or to join a political party—which are closely linked to freedom of expression, [and] draws 
heavily on the principles developed by the Court under Article 10.”54 The second category 
mainly deals with issues of trade-unions, where the Court’s deliberations seem more 
muddled and less decisive.55  Thus the aspect of Art.11 which relates to expression, a 
standard principle of democracy, is stronger (in Court practice) than other aspects of 
Art.11.   
 
2.2.2.2 Freedom of Assembly and Association: ICCPR 
The ICCPR provisions to protect these rights contain two of the only three references to a 
“democratic society.”  The third reference to a “democratic society” is in Art.14 concerning 
a fair trial. It is curious that this specific limitation enters the clause in the 
assembly/association Articles and not other places.  It is difficult to flush out the value of 
this consideration because the prevailing literature doesn’t tend to give it much notice and 
HRC case law on these Articles has been minimal.  It is of course true that the 
consideration implies a more specified evaluation of proportionality, though what that 
exactly entails is unclear.  There is not yet a General Comment on either of these Articles, 
so the only guidance available is the Siracusa Principles which state that the consideration 
of a democratic society “…shall be interpreted as imposing a further restriction on the 
limitation clauses it qualifies” and that this further restriction is predicated on the fact that a 
limitation must not “…impair the democratic functioning of the society.”56  The next 
subpart of the consideration of the limitation in the Siracusa Principles seems intended to 
acknowledge the opaqueness of these previous two, it states: “While there is no single 
model of a democratic society, a society which recognizes and respects the human rights 
set forth in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights may 
                                                 
53 Ovey (2006) p.344 
54 Ovey (2006) p.344 
55 Ovey (2006) p.344 
56 Siracusa Principles: I.B.ii. 
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be viewed as meeting this definition.”  This final definition is quite broad and has 
interesting implications if it is to be taken seriously.  
2.2.3 Voting Equality 
Dahl’s next standard for a democratic process is that of voting equality. This is the “equal 
and effective opportunity to vote, and all votes must be counted as equal.”57  This 
requirement is generally considered the political crux of democracy.  A vote is the political 
expression of the will of the electorate.  
 
2.2.3.1 Voting Rights: ECHR 
Voting rights in the CoE are in Art.3 of Protocol 1 (P1-3).58  The main component of P1-3 
(for this discussion) is the aim of the right, which is to “ensure the free expression of the 
opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.”59   
Article 3 of the First Protocol underpins the whole structure of the 
Convention in requiring that the laws should be made by a legislature 
responsible to the people.  Free elections are thus a condition of the 
‘effective political democracy’ referred to in the Preamble, and of the 
concept of a democratic society which runs through the Convention.60 
P1-3 overtly references the concept of political expression through voting rights. It does 
not, however, overtly require a specific political structure.  What constitutes a “legislature” 
is decided by the Court on a case-by-case basis and has been interpreted to be broader than 
strictly national parliaments.61 
 
Despite the fact that there are no express limitations listed within the text of the right, the 
Court repeatedly notes that there are implied limitations.  These implied limitations have 
taken similar form to the structure of limitations on Arts.8-11 in that they require that the 
essence of the right itself not be impinged upon, that the aim pursued must be considered 
                                                 
57 Dahl’s (1998) p.37 
58 The ECHR and its Protocols (which are in force) should be taken as a whole.  
59 ECHR P1-3 
60 Ovey (2006) p.388 
61 Ovey (2006) p.391 
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legitimate, and the means considered proportional.62  The primary consideration of the 
aims then shifts from “necessary in a democratic society” to the requirement that the “free 
expression of the will of the people” not be hindered.  Thus, “[i]f a person complains that 
he or she is disqualified from voting, the Court’s task is to consider whether such 
disqualification affects the free expression of the opinion of the people under Article 3.”63 
Here then there is a trade off between necessity in a democratic society and the free choice 
of the legislature, but the purpose of the restriction is aimed at the same result, suggesting 
that these two concepts are interchangeable.  
 
2.2.3.2 Voting Rights: ICCPR 
Art.25 of the ICCPR goes much further in securing political rights than does P1-3.  It sets 
out the right to (a) take part in public affairs directly or through representatives, (b) to vote 
in elections which, among other things, guarantees the free expression of the will of the 
electors, and (c) have equal access to public services.64  Still, Art.25, like P1-3 ECHR, does 
not require a specific form of government, but rather requires that any form chosen be in 
conformity with Art.25 and, specifically, with the free expression of the will of the 
electors.65     
 
GC-25 on Art.25, unlike the article itself, refers directly to democracy and states the 
importance of Art.25 in this domain; “Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government 
based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the 
Covenant.”66  It strengthens this tie to democracy through the elaboration of several other 
rights and requirements that are interlinked with Art.25: “Citizens also take part in the 
conduct of public affairs by exerting influence through public debate and dialogue with 
their representatives or through their capacity to organize themselves.  This participation is 
                                                 
62 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium  §52 
63 Ovey (2006) p.392 referring to X v. Belgium 
64 ICCPR Art.25 
65 HRC-GC-25-§21 
66 HRC-GC-25-§1 
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supported by ensuring freedom of expression, assembly and association.”67 This concept of 
participation is further strengthened in connection with Art.27 on minority rights, the HRC 
has concluded (in GC-23) that there is a requirement that a State allow for “effective 
participation of members of minority communities in decisions which affect them.”68 
 
Without explicitly requiring democracy, the HRC has indirectly linked democracy to the 
requirement that State Parties ensure to those within its jurisdiction69  the rights within the 
Covenant.  This is done most explicitly in §1 of GC-25 where the structure of the paragraph 
hints at a substantive connection: 
Whatever form of constitution or government is in force, the Covenant 
requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the 
rights it protects.  Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government 
based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of 
the Covenant.70 [end paragraph] 
The ICCPR does not explicitly require a democracy as the ECHR does, but it seems to 
make up for this lacuna in its well flushed out Art.25 which is broader and more direct than 
its European counterpart. 
2.2.4 Enlightened Understanding 
The third standard of democracy is a requirement that the electorate have an enlightened 
understanding.  This entails that citizens have “equal and effective opportunities for 
learning about the relevant alternative political policies and their likely consequences.”71  
This requirement is the extension of the concept of political equality.  Noting that people 
are intrinsically equal in their claims to rights is not enough to ensure political equality.  
                                                 
67 HRC-GC-25-§8; Steiner (2000)  p.892: “In view of their essential role in most political activities, the 
expressive rights to free speech, press, assembly and association must in some way inform any theory of 
participation. Their prominence in the International Covenant reminds us that Article 25 should not be 
approached as an isolated provision, detached from the larger structure of rights in the Covenant. That larger 
structure here suggests that the ‘take part’ and ‘elections’ clauses assume some degree of public political 
debate and of citizens’ participation in political groups expressing their beliefs or interests.”  
68 (emphasis mine); HRC-GC-23-§7; Joseph (2004) p.658 
69 allowing some digression in voting rights and political activities for non-citizens 
70 HRC-GC-25-§1 
71 Dahl (1998) p.37 
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The legitimacy of the expression of the opinion of the people depends on access to 
information. 
2.2.4.1 Enlightened Understanding: ECHR 
The concept of enlightened understanding is not manifested as explicitly in the ECHR as 
have been the previous standards for democracy.  However, noting that the Convention is 
to be read as a whole, a combination of rights may cover this standard.  Returning to 
Art.10.1 shows that not only is there a right to hold opinions, but also within freedom of 
expression is the right to “…receive and impart information and ideas without interference 
by public authority and regardless of frontiers.”  Returning also to the text of Art.11 it is 
clear that the right to associate and assemble is predicated on the notion of protecting one’s 
interests.72   
 
Further, there is P1-2, the right to education.  Though this right does not specifically 
address the content of education, there is a consideration for maintaining the pluralism73 
necessary to a democratic society through the consideration of the rights of parents to 
“…ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and 
philosophical convictions.”74  This requirement and its consideration for and promotion of 
pluralism helps contribute to an enlightened electorate.  Further, 
The Court has recognized that the right to education has links with the 
rights protected by Articles 8-10 of the Convention and needs to be 
interpreted consistently with the general spirit of the Convention as an 
instrument designed to maintain and promote the ideas and values of a 
democratic society.75  
2.2.4.2 Enlightened Understanding: The ICCPR 
Enlightened understanding also does not appear as a codified right in the ICCPR but, as 
with the ECHR, there is a composite of rights that seem to cover the standard.  Firstly, 
                                                 
72 Art.11.1 ECHR: “Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association 
with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.”  
73 Handyside v. UK §49: “Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without 
which there is no ’democratic society’.”  
74 ECHR P1-2 
75 Ovey (2006) p.377 referencing Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark §54 
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there is there is freedom of expression in which, “[e]veryone shall have the right to hold 
opinions without interference.”76  In addition to this, Art.20.2 prohibits any advocacy 
which “…constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence…” and so protects 
against damaging or dangerous manipulation of information.77  Then once again Art.21 
(assembly) and 22 (association) can both contribute to an enlightened understanding 
through the formulation and transmission of ideas and knowledge.    
 
Unlike the ECHR there is no provision in the ICCPR for education.  There is a provision in 
CESCR (Art.13).  The right to education also exists in the CRC (Art.7) which is widely 
considered customary law due to its extensive ratification. So a right to education is aptly 
covered by other Conventions. However, it is notable that here education is considered a 
social right rather than a civil or political right. 
 
2.2.4.3 Enlightened Understanding: Summing up  
Clearly neither the ECHR nor the ICCPR fully cover a requirement of an enlightened 
electorate.  Though there are provisions within the Conventions that do somewhat address 
the concept, it is not specifically provided for, and the ICCPR notably lacks a provision on 
education.  However, freedom of expression does healthily cover freedom of the press and, 
as stated earlier, is particularly effective concerning press that contributes to political 
debate.  Non-discrimination in Art.14 and P-12 of the ECHR, and Art.26 of the ICCPR 
may help to ensure an equal opportunity78 to enlightened understanding. Non-
discrimination is a fundamental theme of democratic governance in that it equalizes the 
claims to goods; non-discrimination will be addressed more directly in “2.2.6 Inclusion of 
Adults.” 
                                                 
76 Art.19.1 ICCPR 
77 The U.S. has submitted a reservation on Art.20 arguing that it infringes freedom of speech, see ICCPR U.S. 
Res. 
78 Dahl (1998) p.37 
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2.2.5 Control of the Agenda 
The fourth standard for democracy is control of the agenda.  The populace should decide 
what matters are to be placed on the political agenda, and how they are to be placed there.79  
Control of the agenda is a natural outgrowth of a properly formatted democracy, meaning 
that it is responsive to the public. This standard is covered by the right to vote and the free 
expression of the will of the people. 
2.2.5.1 Control of the Agenda: ECHR and ICCPR 
Both Conventions are structured so as to require the State Party to be responsive to 
(respect, protect), and engaged with (fulfil), the populace. The right to vote, P1-3 ECHR 
and Art.25 ICCPR, assumes that the legislature is both an expression of the will of the 
people, as well as responsive to the will of the people (due to the requirement of frequent 
elections).80 Secondly, freedom of expression has a individual right element (to hold an 
opinion) and an element which is of a more collective nature (see Art.19.2 ICCPR).81 The 
formula of State obligations combined with these rights establishes a model in which the 
people have enough access to exert control over the political agenda. 
2.2.6 Inclusion of Adults 
The final standard of democracy is the inclusion of adults in which Dahl simply presents 
that all adults should full citizen’s rights.82  This is a logical outgrowth of the moral 
principle of intrinsic equality83 which, in human rights terms, is synonymous with inherent 
dignity.   
2.2.6.1 Inclusion of Adults: ECHR  
The ECHR covers this standard through several laws.  The main thrust lies in non-
discrimination Articles and in Art.1 which states: “The High Contracting Parties shall 
secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of 
                                                 
79 Dahl (1998) p.38 
80 For more on the responsiveness of the legislature see GC-25-§7+§8 
81 Nowak (2005) p.438-441 
82 Dahl (1998) p.38, p.78 
83 Dahl (1998) p.65 
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this Convention.”84 Though Art.1 is not particularly a non-discrimination provision, it deals 
with the equality principle and therefore sets the standard for what is to be judged as 
discrimination.85 Discrimination is dealt with in Art.14 as well as in P12.  Art.14 is peculiar 
in that it limits its scope of protection to rights guaranteed within the Convention. P12 
addresses this peculiarity by expanding the scope to “any right set forth by law.”86 P12 
came into force in 2005 and is formulated in reference to Art.14 and is constructed 
narrowly. 87 There has yet to be any case-law on P12 so it is difficult to judge its scope and 
influence.  Regardless, it is clear that Art.14 and P12 support and protect the human rights 
within the ECHR which contribute to an implicit requirement of democratic governance 
and thus the standard of inclusion of adults, for our purposes, is well covered. 
2.2.6.2 Inclusion of Adults: ICCPR 
Much like Art.1 ECHR, Art.2.1 of the ICCPR asserts that the State Party must guarantee 
the rights in the Convention to all within its jurisdiction “…without distinction of any kind” 
and thus establishes equality in regards to claims concerning the protection of the 
Covenant. The ICCPR also contains a particular provision for the equality of men and 
women (Art.3). The ICCPR’s general non-discrimination clause, Art.26, prohibits 
discrimination in reference to the provisions of the Covenant as well as in the national laws 
of State Parties;88  its effect is equal to Art.14 ECHR and P12 combined.  In relation to the 
standard of inclusion of adults, Art.25 also goes further than the ECHR in guaranteeing (in 
Art.25(a)) that citizens have the right “[t]o take part in the conduct of public affairs, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives.” The ICCPR addresses the inclusion of 
adults implicitly through its applicability to all within the State Party’s jurisdiction, and 
explicitly through non-discrimination and as a part of voting rights.    
                                                 
84 emphasis mine 
85 For the formula concerning when treatment becomes discriminatory based on the equality principle, see 
P12 Explanatory Report §15.  
86 ECHR P-12 Art.1.1 
87 For more information on P12 see the Explanatory Report (P-12 ER); P-12 ER §24 of the Commentary on 
the Provisions 
88 HRC-GC-18-§12: “In the view of the Committee, article 26 does not merely duplicate the guarantee 
already provided for in article 2 but provides in itself an autonomous right.  It prohibits discrimination in law 
or in fact in any field regulated and protected by public authorities.”  
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2.3 Conclusion of Section 
It is not overly ambitious to argue that the core standards of democracy, as delineated by 
Robert A. Dahl, find firm grounding in the civil and political rights of the ECHR and the 
ICCPR.  Though the ECHR has the advantage of a clearly established commitment to 
democracy, there seems to be little effective difference between the protections the 
Conventions provide.  Admittedly, both Conventions are less thorough in their composite 
protection of the third standard (enlightened understanding) and the fourth standard 
(control of the agenda).  However, both of these standards are as much a result of a political 
system as they are standards of it; they may be effects of the other standards.  
 
Through GCs, ECtHR decisions, human rights literature, and other mediums of the human 
rights regime, an implicit right to democracy has begun to broaden its base of support in the 
foundation of the Conventions, the codified rights within the Conventions, and the 
enumerated requirements of those rights. This type of authoritative decision-making is 
what structures law, especially in the context of this galvanizing democratization trend. 
Understanding democracy in this authoritative sense is critical to its potency and validity as 
a universal requirement:  
The value of enforcing the entitlement as a legal rule becomes subject to the 
outcome of discussions involving highly complex issues of local culture, political 
economy and resource allocation. If democracy is thereby understood as a 
contingent value, then a legal rule embodying democratic principles will suffer 
from perpetual contingency as well.89  
 
The ECHR has a firm and explicit grounding in, and consideration of, a democratic society. 
The ECtHR employs a consideration of a “margin of appreciation” when evaluating State 
obligations concerning the ensured rights.  This margin is a country-specific and situation-
specific scope of leeway afforded to a State Party for the general purpose of allowing for 
consideration of particular circumstances relating to the experiences and challenges of 
States within Europe.  Because the requirement of democracy is such a strongly grounded 
value in the European system, the margin of appreciation would most likely widen if a 
                                                 
89 Fox (2000a) p.1 
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State’s actions are intended to preserve or secure democracy and would narrow if a State’s 
actions were not conceived to be in line with democratic values.  In this way, the 
consideration of democracy in the European system becomes dynamic and molds itself to 
progressive common understandings of its meaning and scope. 
 
The HRC does not acknowledge democracy as a grounding principle of the ICCPR90 and, 
despite its wider and more varied membership, there is no consideration for a margin of 
appreciation.  However, as alluded to earlier, the differences in the delineated standards of 
protection (versus the ECHR) of the various rights are seldom glaring or gross.  The rights 
themselves are similarly formatted and their protections are consistent enough to argue that 
the consideration of “necessary in a democratic society” as an explicit requirement isn’t of 
pivotal importance to the protection of universal human rights and so is not pivotal in the 
protection of the building blocks of democracy.  From this evaluation it seems that the 
consideration that may be necessary to preserve and promote democracy already exists 
within the Covenant—it is implicit.  
 
Human rights, as both a conception and as a field of law, seem to be growing increasingly 
persuasive in the field of international politics and relations.  It is therefore significant to 
note the political slant of the universal requirements of dignity. An implicit right to 
democracy is grounded in inherent dignity and flows naturally from the universal 
requirements of such dignity. Human rights regime requirements are meant to inform 
international legal sovereignty. Uncovering an implicit right through these avenues (taking 
a law-as-process approach) posits democracy as a contingency for universal human dignity 
and such a requirement should also inform the standards of international legal sovereignty.    
                                                 
90 It is notable that the UDHR refers to democracy within its limitation clause in Art.29.2 though this has not 
passed on to the Covenants due to Cold War proclivities.  
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3 Actual Democracy 
The above section focused on the five standards of democratic processes.  In his work “On 
Democracy,” Dahl goes on to postulate what types of institutions would be necessary in a 
governmental democracy.  Admittedly this is a difficult task in that the standards being 
drawn upon are broad and no democracy is perfect or near perfect enough to serve as a 
direct template.91  He lists six minimal requirements for a large scale democracy: elected 
officials; free, fair, and frequent elections; freedom of expression; alternative sources of 
information; associational autonomy; and inclusive citizenship.  Dahl generally refers to 
large scale governmental democracy as a “polyarchy.”92 
 
The standards of democracy are universal in the sense that they apply to the core of what 
democracy means.  They are the standards for a democratic group of five people as they are 
the standards for a democratic international organization.  These minimal requirements for 
a polyarchy however, are the practical conditions for a democratic group the size in which 
“…the number of citizens becomes too numerous or too widely dispersed 
geographically…for them to participate conveniently in making laws by assembling in one 
place”93 as is the case with the government of a country. 
3.1 Elected Officials 
Effective participation and control of the agenda as standards for democracy change from 
direct participation to indirect participation in a polyarchy.  A polyarchy is too wide and 
dispersed for direct participation.  “The only feasible solution, though it is highly 
imperfect, is for citizens to elect their top officials and hold them more or less accountable 
through elections by dismissing them, so to speak, in subsequent elections.”94 
                                                 
91 Dahl (1998) p.42, p.84 
92 Dahl (1998) p.90 
93 Dahl (1998) p.93 
94 Dahl(1998) p.93 
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3.1.1 Elected Officials: ECHR and ICCPR 
The requirement of elected officials is covered peripherally by P1-3 in the ECHR.  The 
Article implies that a legislature exists and ensures the free expression of the people in its 
choice: 
Article 3 of the First Protocol ‘presupposes the existence of a 
representative legislature, elected at reasonable intervals, as the basis of a 
democratic society’. It goes further than requiring free elections; it 
requires that the exercise of political power be subject to a freely elected 
legislature.95 
 
The ICCPR also secures these conditions.  GC-25 §7 asserts strongly that, 
Where citizens participate in the conduct of public affairs through freely 
chosen representatives, it is implicit in article 25 that those representatives 
do in fact exercise governmental power and that they are accountable 
through the electoral process for their exercise of that power. 
The Comment then goes on to address the concept of control of the agenda by stating, 
Citizens also take part in the conduct of public affairs by exerting influence 
through public debate and dialogue with their representatives or through 
their capacity to organize themselves. This participation is supported by 
ensuring freedom of expression, assembly and association.96 
3.2 Free, Fair, and Frequent Elections 
Free, fair and frequent elections require that citizens “can go to the polls without fear of 
reprisal,” all votes are counted equally, and elections take place on a relatively frequent 
basis (somewhere between 1-5 years).97  The freedom from fear is covered in both 
Conventions in the right to life, the right to movement, and the rights protecting liberty and 
security.98 
 
3.2.1 Free, Fair, and Frequent Elections: ECHR 
As stated earlier, P1-3 does not guarantee every person a right to vote; rather it secures the 
free expression of the will of the people in the choice of the legislature.  This may be an 
                                                 
95 Ovey (2006) p.388 referencing The Greek Case 
96 HRC-GC-25-§8 
97 Dahl’s (1998) p.95 
98 ECHR: Art.2, Art.5, P4-2; ICCPR: Art.6, Art.9, Art.12 
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important difference in relation to the ICCPR’s Art.25.  The Court notes that there are 
implied limitations99 to the right to vote and to stand for election (that go beyond the 
general limitations requirement in Art.17) but it seems that this condition goes no further 
than the restrictions available in Arts.8-11. However, in the case of Mathieu-Mohin and 
Clerfayt v. Belgium the restrictions placed on elections concerning language areas seemed 
to challenge the straightforwardness of the notion of free, fair, and frequent elections and 
result in the Court supporting a system in which some citizens’ votes have less potency 
than others.100 
 
Another restriction is revealed in Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) v. Turkey.  Refah 
Partisi was an increasingly popular political party in Turkey which aimed at implementing 
a system of justiciable Sharia law. Though highly debated by scholars, the seeming aims of 
Refah Partisi were in conflict with what the Turkish government viewed as the fundamental 
elements of democracy. The ECtHR agreed (both at Chamber level and at Grand Chamber 
level) with the Turkish government’s contention that Sharia is incompatible with the 
fundamental principles of democracy as set forth by the Convention.101 The Court ruled 
that  
…a political party whose leaders incite violence or put forward a policy 
which fails to respect democracy or which is aimed at the destruction of 
democracy and the flouting of the rights and freedoms recognised in a 
democracy cannot lay claim to the Convention’s protection against 
penalties imposed on those grounds.102  
                                                 
99 Santoro v. Italy §54 
100 54.  …It does not follow, however, that all votes must necessarily have equal weight as regards the 
outcome of the election or that all candidates must have equal chances of victory. Thus no electoral system 
can eliminate "wasted votes". 
For the purposes of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-3), any electoral system must be assessed in the light of 
the political evolution of the country concerned; features that would be unacceptable in the context of one 
system may accordingly be justified in the context of another, at least so long as the chosen system provides 
for conditions which will ensure the "free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the 
legislature". 
101 Refah Partisi v. Turkey §123-124 
102 §98 
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The State dissolved the political party to prevent a, supposedly, anti-democratic party from 
democratically attaining power.  The Court ruled that such dissolution of a political party 
was legitimate, setting the standard that a State Party can validly limit free and fair 
elections in order to protect democracy from itself.  The purity of a representative system 
then is mitigated by the consideration of democracy in the ECHR generally and Art.17 
specifically.103 This intersection of human rights protection and democratic practices shows 
the mutual interrelatedness of these considerations ingrained into the European Convention.  
 
3.2.2 Free, Fair, and Frequent Elections: ICCPR 
The free, fair, and frequent elections condition is clearly laid out in GC-25 §19, “In 
conformity with paragraph (b), elections must be conducted fairly and freely on a periodic 
basis within a framework of laws guaranteeing the effective exercise of voting rights.” 
The ICCPR, as with the ECHR, does allow States to impose restrictions on the right to 
vote.  This can be seen in Gillot et al v. France in which the HRC recognized that 
residency restrictions on voting in particular referenda (when taken in light of self-
determination) were not a violation of Art.25. It has not, however, gone so far as the 
ECtHR in allowing the dissolution of a political party. 
3.3 Freedom of Expression 
Dahl explains that there must be freedom of expression for actual democracy and 
democratic institutions to be true to the standards of democracy.  This includes not only the 
right to express one’s self, but also the right to “hear what others have to say.”104  He links 
freedom of expression to the standards of effective participation, enlightened 
understanding, and influence of the agenda.105  Freedom of expression, which has been 
                                                 
103 ECHR Art.17:”Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person 
any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and 
freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.”  
104 Dahl’s (1998) p.97 
105 Dahl (1998) p.96-7 
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explored in-depth earlier, is covered in both Conventions and thus required to be respected, 
protected, and fulfilled by every State Party.106  
3.4 Alternative Sources of Information 
The fourth minimal requirement for a large scale democracy is that the citizenry must have 
access to alternative and independent sources of information to be able to participate in a 
truly enlightened manner.107  The HRC flushes-out this requirement a bit further by noting 
that: 
In order to ensure the full enjoyment of rights protected by article 25, the 
free communication of information and ideas about public and political 
issues between citizens, candidates and elected representatives is essential.  
This implies a free press and other media able to comment on public 
issues without censorship or restraint and to inform public opinion.  It 
requires the full enjoyment and respect for the rights guaranteed in articles 
19, 21, and 22 of the Covenant, and including freedom to engage in 
political activity individually or through political parties and other 
organizations, freedom to debate public affairs, to hold peaceful 
demonstrations and meetings, to criticize and oppose, to publish political 
material, to campaign for election and to advertise political ideas.108 
 
The requirements of Art.25, as noted earlier, go further than those requirements for P1-3 
but P1-3 is to be considered an integrated part of the Convention109 and thus should be 
viewed in a holistic sense with other rights and with the notion that the ECHR is a living 
document.110 This holistic approach can be seen in the Handyside case where Art.10 is seen 
as a particular aspect of democracy: 
Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10 (art. 10-2), [freedom of expression] is 
applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received 
or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those 
that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such 
                                                 
106 This statement oversimplifies in that that reservations and derogations can be made on freedom of 
expression. 
107 Dahl (1998) p.97-8 
108 HRC-GC-25-§25 
109 ECHR P1-5 
110 see inter alia Tyrer v. the UK §31: “The convention is a living instrument which…must be interpreted in 
the light of present day conditions.” 
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are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without 
which there is no ‘democratic society.’111 
Though Handyside is the oft-quoted case concerning freedom of expression, its 
ruling must be viewed in light of Refah Partisi. The limitations on expression for 
the preservation of democracy in terms of Refah Partisi seem to strike at the core 
of the consideration of pluralism in Handyside. So, once again, human rights are 
curtailed when they seem to stretch into a realm deemed dangerous to the 
promotion and protection of democracy. 
3.5 Associational Autonomy 
Associational autonomy, or the right to form relatively independent associations or 
organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups,112 are necessary 
for a large scale democracy to ensure that elections can be adequately challenged and 
legislators can be influenced by the citizenry.113 They also serve as a form of civic 
education and enlightenment.114 
 
This requirement is covered by the rights to freedom of association and assembly noted 
earlier in ECHR Art.11 and ICCPR Art.21 and 22.  In consideration of space, the 
discussion concerning these rights will not be repeated here.  
3.6 Inclusive citizenship 
The last minimal requirement for a polyarchal government is inclusive citizenship.  This, of 
course, entails universal suffrage, that all people are equal before the law and under the 
law, and non-discrimination.  All of these rights are codified and aptly protected in both the 
ECHR and the ICCPR.115 
                                                 
111 Handyside v. UK  §49 
112 Dahl (1998) p.86 
113 Dahl (1998) p.98 
114 Dahl (1998) p.98 
115 ECHR: P1-3, Art.5, Art.6, Art.14, P12;  ICCPR: Art.25, Art.14, Art.3, Art.26  
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3.7 Conclusion of Section 
It is clear that the five standards for democracy and the six minimal institutional 
requirements for democracy are not a complete blueprint for a successful government nor 
are they limits to what democracy can achieve.  What they are however, are logical 
minimal elements of a cohesive definition of democracy in a theoretical sense and in a 
practical political sense. Though not perfectly aligned, these elements are supported and 
well defined by codified human rights.   
 
The two human rights systems addressed here, though differing (often slightly) in their 
textual formulation, are mostly similar in their content as well as their accepted limitations 
and considerations.  Democracy and human rights seem to sometimes operate as checks 
and balances in relation to one another, and in that sense, define each other’s boundaries.  
State Parties to the Conventions limit their internal sovereignty in line with human rights 
obligations (at least in theory) and democracy is the source of that sovereignty which is to 
be limited.  This connection shows the interdependent and indissoluble116 link between 
human rights and democracy. It is then relatively safe to say that democracy and human 
rights form a symbiotic coalition that serves well to clarify the definition and requirements 
of democracy and which reinforce the scope and requirements of human rights.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
116 The term “indissoluble” is taken from various UN documents, for example UNCHR Resolution 2000/47 
and GA Resolution 55/96 (2000). 
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4 The Added Value of Institutional Work 
4.1 Introduction 
The human rights regime, beyond reference to specific rights within the ECHR and the 
ICCPR, goes further in the promotion and elucidation of democracy. The international 
human rights community presents democratic trends which are built on human rights and 
are formulated through the influence of the evolving standards and situations of the State 
Parties. Institutional work goes beyond the core standards and requirements of democratic 
governance to expand democracy’s role in the international legal realm—it does this 
through the particular avenue of human rights. 
4.2 The Relevant Institutions  
Democracy has been a pillar of the European system of human rights since its inception,117 
and these links are elaborated more strongly and more numerously as time progresses.118  
The CoE was created in 1949 with the aims to promote human rights, democracy, and the 
rule of law; it is a strong and stable system which presents unequivocal support for 
democracy and democratization.119  Its documents establish a strong link between 
democracy and human rights and premise that the two are symbiotic.120   
 
With the waning of the Cold War121 and the democratization of Latin America122 in the end 
of the 1980s the United Nations regime joined the CoE’s explicit promotion of 
democracy.123 Though there is no reference to a specific “right” to democracy in the 
ICCPR, nor does the word “democracy” appear anywhere in the UN Charter, it has been 
                                                 
117 Pratchett (2004) especially Chapter 3 
118 See the Forum on the Future of Democracy, the Warsaw Declaration, etc. 
119 CoE Statute 
120 Forum for the Future of Democracy: Conclusions by the General Rapporteurs §6 
121 E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/32 §24: “The [UDHR] and, subsequently, the Covenants, could not refer directly to 
democracy as a right, since any attempt to do so was thwarted by the ideological confrontation arising from 
the cold war. Those instruments opted instead to separate out the basic elements of the rule of law and 
democracy and to deal with them as separate rights, particularly the right to free and fair elections, citizens’ 
access to the public service and the conduct of government in a non-discriminatory basis.”  
122 Human Rights in Perspective (1992) p.xi-xiii 
123 OHCHR Democracy; inter alia UNCHR Resolutions 2003/36, 2005/29, 2005/32; OHCHR Democracy- 
Progress So Far; Vienna Declaration 1993 §8 
 33
argued that democracy is one of the founding principles and primary commitments of the 
UN.124 Democracy promotion fits nicely into the three main purposes of the UN as set out 
in the preamble of the Charter: preventing the scourge of war, protecting and promoting 
human rights, and development in terms of social progress and human rights.125 There has 
been a steady stream of Resolutions from the UNCHR (now replaced by the Human Rights 
Council), various seminars, and GA resolutions concerning the promotion of democracy in 
the UN system and the interrelatedness of democracy and human rights.  The UDHR, 
widely considered an authoritative interpretation of the UN Charter’s references to human 
rights, lays out electoral rights in Art.21 and requires a social order in which human rights 
can be fully realized (Art.28).  Despite the UN Charter being clearly and intentionally 
without reference to democracy and the fact that the UN membership is not composed of 
universally democratic states, the discourse on democracy has quickly acquired strength 
since the end of the Cold War.126 
 
The OSCE (originally the CSCE) was originally “[c]oncieved as a compromise instrument 
to bridge the ideological chasm that divided East from West in the 1970’s…”127  With the 
end of the Cold War, the OSCE’s role expanded to address issues of rule of law, of 
democracy, and of minority rights etc. The OSCE commitments are not legally binding but 
rather are political commitments which have significant strength. There are three main 
OSCE documents which strongly address participatory rights: the Copenhagen Document, 
the Charter of Paris, and the Moscow Document.  These documents establish clear and 
influential principles concerning democratic government and its links with human rights.   
… [T]he OSCE has pioneered a holistic approach to human rights, which 
proceeds on the assumption that individual rights are best protected in 
states which adhere to the rule of law and democratic values and are so 
constituted to permit these concepts to flourish.128 
                                                 
124 OHCHR Democracy referencing former Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali 
125 UNCharter Preamble; The UN role in promoting democracy: between ideals and reality (2004) p.5-10 
126 Vienna Declaration 1993 §8 
127 Buergenthal (2002) p.205 
128 Buergenthal (2002) p.213 
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4.2.1 Rule of Law, Democratic Security, Sustainable Development, Racism, and 
Poverty Reduction 
The principle of the rule of law, fidelity to written law and the principle that no one is 
above the law, overlaps and interconnects with that of democracy. The rule of law is 
necessarily a precondition for a human-rights-based definition of democracy because the 
standards of democracy are predicated on the vertical legal relationship between 
jurisdictional subject and State and are formulated in international law. It is consistently 
noted in UNCHR Resolutions, the work of the OSCE,129 and CoE documents that 
democracy and the rule of law are interdependent and are “both necessary to create an 
environment in which human rights can be realized.”130 The human rights regime has then 
strengthened the grounding of democracy through its work on the promotion of rule of law 
principles. 
 
The Warsaw Declaration of 2005 (CoE) makes reference to the concept of “democratic 
security” of the European region, which it hopes to preserve and strengthen. This concept, 
bolstered by the work of the OSCE,131 argues that effective democracy is essential for 
“preventing conflicts, promoting stability, facilitating economic and social progress, and 
hence for creating sustainable communities were people want to live and work, now and in 
the future.”132 This consideration shows that democracy is seen as a strong supportive base 
for national aspirations.  
 
                                                 
129 Copenhagen Document (1990) Art.2: “They are determined to support and advance those principles of 
justice which form the basis of the rule of law. They consider that the rule of law does not mean merely a 
formal legality which assures regularity and consistency in the achievement and enforcement of democratic 
order, but justice based on the recognition and full acceptance of the supreme value of the human personality 
and guaranteed by institutions providing a framework for its fullest expression.”; “Human Rights, Democracy 
and Rule of Law” Charter of Paris (1990) 
130 Conclusions and Recommendations of the Expert Seminar on Democracy and the Rule of Law Art.1  
131“Friendly Relations among Participating States” Charter of Paris (1990): “The participating states express 
their conviction that full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the development of societies 
based on pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are prerequisites for progress in setting up the lasting order 
of peace, security, justice and co-operation that they seek to establish in Europe.” Copenhagen Document 
(1990) preamble; “Our relations will rest on our common adherence to democratic values and to human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. We are convinced that in order to strengthen peace and security among our States, 
the advancement of democracy, and respect for and effective exercise of human rights, are indispensable…”  
132 Warsaw Declaration (Art.3) 
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Democracy and development133 are considered to be interdependent and mutually 
reinforcing.134 The elements of popular participation, non-discrimination, and the 
promotion of a “culture of democracy”135 or similarly the promotion of economic, social, 
and cultural rights136 contribute to development policies that are effective and rights-based. 
More recently the non-discriminatory effective participation aspect of democracy has been 
linked to both a reduction in racism and poverty rates.137 All of these considerations 
broaden democratic considerations and thus further integrate it into the international legal 
realm and ground it firmly in the evolving concerns of the human rights field. 
4.2.2 The Formulation of Democracy 
Beginning in 2001 the UNCHR Resolutions started making reference to the rich diversity 
of democracies across the globe. With subsequent resolutions two concepts seem to have 
emerged from this recognition of diverse democracies. The first is that,  
…each society and every context has its own indigenous and relevant 
democratic institutional traditions, and that while no single institution 
can claim democratic perfection, the combination of domestic 
democratic structures with universal democratic norms is a formidable 
tool in strengthening both the roots and the reach of democracy and in 
advancing a universal understanding of democracy.138  
This concept lays the foundation for a limited definition of the requirements of democracy 
in a way that allows for States to formulate their own national systems while paying heed 
to State sovereignty, evolving conceptions of democratic requirements, and facilitating 
transitions from non-democratic systems into democracies. It also notes that the core of 
democracy is universal.  
 
The second concept of diversity of democracies appears while the resolutions begin to take 
explicit note of “major changes taking place on the international scene”139 and states that 
“...while all democracies share common features, there is no one model of democracy; 
                                                 
133 later “sustainable development”: UNCHR Resolution 2000/47 Art.(xvi )(g) 
134 for example UNCHR Resolution 2001/36 preamble §5 
135 UNCHR Resolution 1999/57 Art.4 
136 UNCHR Resolution 2005/32 Art.5 
137 inter alia UNCHR Resolution 2002/34 Preamble §12; UNCHR Resolution 2005/29 Preamble §18+19 
138 UNCHR Resolution 2003/35 Preamble §20; UNCHR Resolution 2005/29 Preamble §27 
139 inter alia UNCHR Resolution 2003/35 Preamble §8; UNCHR Resolution 2005/29 Preamble §9 
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therefore we must not seek to export any particular model of democracy.”140 This especially 
timely stipulation,141 as with the previous one, reins in the push towards democratization 
by referencing State sovereignty in relation to political structures.142 It recognizes a clear 
role of the human rights regime in a definitional sense, but rejects an outright role in a 
prescriptive sense.  
4.3 Conclusion of Section 
Democracy is a dynamic player in the maneuverings of the human rights regimes and 
international trends. This dynamism does not alter the core standards or minimal 
requirements of democracy that have been previously laid out, but rather broadens the 
scope of democratic influence through the lens of the human rights regime. The human 
rights institutions use democracy in a wider, more holistic sense, thereby strengthening its 
potency, influence, and legitimacy in the international legal community. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
140 UNCHR Resolution 2005/29 Art.3 (emphasis mine) 
141 Pratchett (2004) section “Problems, challenges and opportunities: Challenges”: “In particular, the 
challenge is one of concomitant convergence around core beliefs, rules and institutions while, at the same 
time, seeking to protect and encourage local, national, regional and local differences and identities. As the 
only body to which all European democracies accede, the Council of Europe has an important role to play in 
balancing these challenges.” 
142 UNCharter Art.2.1, Art.2.4 
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5 The Current Debate: The Value of Human Rights Discourse 
UNCHR Resolution 1999/57 is titled “Promotion of the right to democracy.” The 
Resolution does not unequivocally claim a right to democracy, but rather takes a path 
similar to that has been laid out in this paper, that of arguing that the “fundamental 
democratic rights and freedoms”143 are based in human rights law. This resolution is the 
most broad-sweeping, and has the highest acceptance vote and the fewest abstentions of 
any of the resolutions dealing primarily with democracy. The “right” to democracy is not 
mentioned in future resolutions. Shying away from the term signifies a marked reluctance, 
but does not cut to the validity of a possible right. As numerous resolutions continue to lay 
out the standards and scope of democratic requirements and relationships, and the CoE and 
the OSCE continue to make passionate commitments to democracy, and with the increasing 
number of election-monitoring activities of the UN and seminars and forums of the various 
organizations, the assertion of a “right” grows in strength and in content and moves steadily 
toward a more enumerated vision and so becomes more right-like.  
5.1 An Emerging Right to Democracy 
The political science literature concerning this topic tends to argue an emerging right to 
democracy based primarily on UN election monitoring activities. The pivotal article “The 
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance” by Thomas M. Franck approaches the subject 
from an international relations avenue and thus sees democratic entitlement on a continuum 
of normative progression.144 The approach focuses on trends which slowly modify the 
requirement of international legal sovereignty and may lead to a requirement of democratic 
governance for the international recognition of legitimate statehood. This argument is 
constructed by using human rights as a support rather than a driving force. The article links 
democracy to some human rights arguing the standards of democracy are primarily self-
determination, freedom of expression, and the right to free and open elections.145 
Groundbreaking in its topic and argument, the article limits the scope of democratic 
entitlement too narrowly by focusing too lightly on human rights, as does the subsequent 
                                                 
143 UNCHR Resolution 1999/57 Preamble §6 
144 Franck (1992)  
145 Franck (1992) p.52 
 38
outpouring of literature.146 Franck partially justifies this by noting that when the UN was 
asked to monitor the Nicaraguan Sandinista elections in 1989, the Secretary General linked 
his acceptance of the request to the norms of the international system, not the human rights 
framework.147  
 
Franck makes some dynamic references to the human rights regime. He notes that 
democracy can be linked to the UN’s most important norm: that of the right to peace.148 He 
argues that when considering intervention in protection of the democratic entitlement by 
the international community, human rights can be used as a legitimizing factor due to its 
“…various intrusive forms of monitoring and even [its] envisages [of] sanctions against 
gross violators.” 149 Though perhaps placing too much emphasis on “intrusive” monitoring, 
this is the most potent argument for a human-rights-based conception of democracy offered 
by this perspective. However, this argument is overly simplified and perhaps too 
postulational. As argued earlier, the structure and content of many human rights norms and 
obligations give substance and conceptual validity to a democratic requirement. These 
works unfortunately prefer the more stream-lined and political route of the assurance of 
free and fair elections through monitoring.  
 
5.2 Human Rights as the Basis of the Claim  
Within the last few years, the human rights regime has begun to make a distinctive mark on 
this debate and has begun to help dictate the debate’s structure and content. As Franck and 
many others have noted, the primary concern for an emerging right to democratic 
governance is the legitimacy of the international community infringing or commenting on 
State sovereignty concerning political structure.150 If human rights are used as the basis for 
the claim of the right to democracy (and not simply a supporting element) the issue of 
breaking into and reformulating what legitimizes international legal State sovereignty is 
                                                 
146 Democratic Governance and International Law (2000) 
147 Franck (1992) p.80 
148 Franck (1992) p.87 
149 Franck (1992) p.89 emphasis original  
150 UNCharter Art.2.7 
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already dealt with in the codified human rights Conventions in which States have agreed to 
limit their conceptions of sovereignty in light of considerations of universal norms.151  
Sovereignty is addressed by the international systems inward toward the State through 
obligations; sovereignty of the State is validated from the inside outward through human 
rights protection and promotion within the State. This intimate relationship between 
governance and human rights is solidified through recognition of the political dimension of 
human rights requirements. The discourse of human rights has already built roads into the 
legitimacy of sovereignty, those promoting democracy as imbedded within human rights 
can then make ample use of the human rights discourse to assert its validity. 
 
Sergio Vieira de Mello (the former High Commissioner for Human Rights) introduced the 
term “holistic democracy” in 2002 at the Seminar on the Interdependence Between 
Democracy and Human Rights. Democracy in this sense involves, “the procedural and the 
substantive, formal institutions and informal processes, majorities and minorities, male and 
female, government and civil society, the political and economic, the national and the 
international…[a democracy that is] greater than the sum of its parts.”152 Holistic 
democracy finds its normative basis in human rights standards and “attends both to the 
particular substantive content of those standards, and to their interdependence.”153 The 
multilayered make-up, one that goes beyond simple freedom of expression and the 
requirement of a ballot box, finds strength in the consistency and legitimacy of the already 
established realm of human rights law, and it contributes to the maintenance and legitimacy 
of the human rights regime. It is then a weight-bearing support of, as well as an affirmation 
of, the inviolability of the nation-state. 
5.3 Building a Regime 
There are two main ways to approach the right to democracy. First, international relations 
show an increasing and fast-paced trend toward democratization and international 
                                                 
151 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua §259: ruling a State “is sovereign for the 
purpose of limiting its sovereignty in this field.”  
152 Vieria de Mello (2002) p.3 
153 Vieira de Mello (2002) p.4 
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legitimacy becoming somehow predicated on an emerging democratic requirement built 
primarily on election monitoring and the threat of intervention in undemocratic coups. The 
second approach, that of holistic democracy, sees a right built on the shoulders of other 
rights, a logical extension of an already codified system, and perhaps even more than that, a 
right which is imbedded in the obligations already required of State Parties to human rights 
conventions. It is this second conception, that of an implicit right to democracy, which is 
most logically consistent with the fundamental principles and standards of democratic 
theory and which is of such a comprehensive nature that it reinforces the accepted maxim 
that democracy promotes peace.  It is only when this right is acknowledged (rather than 
built) do nations truly understand the extent of their obligations, for “…democracies which 
violate human rights are not only threatening individuals, they are threatening themselves.  
It is democratic suicide.”154  
 
Beginning from this second approach of an implicit right to democracy, it is possible to see 
that a regime is quickly being built to support the claim to this right. A “regime” is “a set of 
principles, norms, rules and procedures, including coercive measures of various kinds, 
which govern the relationships between States and determine which kinds of behaviour are 
legitimate and which are to be considered dysfunctional.”155 This new regime of 
democratic requirement is, arguably, being first formulated in the human rights regime and, 
as it continues to gather strength and momentum, it will soon form its own separate source 
of validity and modes of operation.156 The value of human rights discourse then is that it 
provides a forum in which the democratic entitlement regime can be effectively 
constructed. 
                                                 
154 Davis (2007) p.2 
155 E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/32 §79 
156 E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/32 §80: “Because of the existing interdependence between human rights and 
democracy, because of the normative, conceptual and instrumental links between the various international 
instruments governing them, and because human rights and democracy are materially and conceptually 
difficult to separate in practice, the emerging international regime on democracy, before asserting itself in its 
own right, is tending to form part of the international human rights regime.” 
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5.4 A Right to Claim 
There is also a theoretical requirement of democratic governance which has yet to be 
addressed: what a “right” entails. As Henry Shue explains, rights must be socially 
guaranteed;157 they must be considered legitimate claims. Though it is possible for one to 
enjoy the substance of a right such as the right to privacy, without actually having a forum 
or mode of claiming that substance, this would result in the situation where the substance 
of the right would not correlate to a right at all, but would rather correlate to a good.158 It is 
only when there exists “(1)…rational basis for a justified demand (2) that the actual 
enjoyment of a substance be (3) socially guaranteed against standard threats”159 that an 
actual right exists. Shue goes on to argue that participation is a basic right: “participation is 
[not] sufficient for the exercise of other rights, but…it is necessary.”160 Accepting that 
participation is a fundamental aspect of democracy and the true well-spring of the core of 
democratic governance, democracy being a basic right in this sense is better posited as a 
right to claim other rights.  
5.5 Moving On 
Having established that the core standards and requirements of democratic governance are 
so solidly grounded in international human rights law and are so interconnected with its 
operation and purposes as to make it an inherent or implicit requirement of legitimate 
international legal sovereignty, the practical concerns of this requirement enter into the 
discussion. The next few chapters look at the specific country situations of both the US and 
of Norway. A picture of how democracy fits into national sovereignty and into country-
specific conceptions of human rights will be composed by melding sources of history, legal 
theory, and political theory.  
                                                 
157 Shue (1996) p.13 
158 Shue (1996) p.74-78 
159 Sbue (1996) p.74 
160 Shue (1996) p.85 
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6 Practical Considerations:  
Human Rights and Democracy in The United States 
6.1 Intro 
The U.S. was a major player in the drafting of the UDHR and was generally enthusiastic 
about the international human rights regime until the 1950s. Since that time the national 
and political tone has fluctuated but the one element that seems to have remained is a stead-
fast commitment to separation between State and (what is perceived to be) supra-state.  
 
U.S. politicians and citizens tend to conceive of human rights as a concern for foreign 
policy rather than national internal policy; “Americans generally think of human rights law 
as protection for oppressed people in distant places, people denied their civil and political 
rights.”161 Having pushed human rights into the realm of foreign policy considerations only 
seems natural when it is understood that U.S. citizens believe their government to not only 
be the source of human rights, but also the exemplifier of them: “For most Americans 
human rights are American values writ large, the export version of its own Bill of 
Rights.”162 This understanding helps to clarify why the U.S. has expressed fidelity to 
human rights conceptions without wholly subjecting itself, the self-proclaimed prime 
example, to international standards.  
 
Despite the boastful and patronizing tone concerning human rights values, this attitude is 
not without some merit. The U.S. has one of the oldest successful Constitutions in the 
world. The country has faced few (if any) popular attempts at revolution from within since 
the Civil War. It has a long-standing tradition in successful democracy and “…has had a 
distinctive history of political stability, which increases its sense of political self-
sufficiency and reduces incentives to stabilize its own institutions with foreign treaties.”163 
Overall, the American “project” has been an overwhelming success. The U.S.’s place as a 
political, economic, and military superpower allows it to sustain its role in the international 
                                                 
161 Stark (2000) see footnote p.79 
162 Ignatieff (2005) p.13-14 
163 Ignatieff (2005) p.17 
 43
arena without needing to acquiesce much of its sovereignty to international standards. The 
U.S. believes it is at the top of the world due to its particular character, any infringement on 
that character would be inappropriate and inconsistent with the good. 
 
The ICCPR does not require a specific method of implementing the provisions it contains, 
though it is without question that securing these provisions is the aim and requirement of 
the treaty.164 Ratification of the ICCPR does not have to be unconditional; it can be valid 
to, as appropriate, make reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs) 
conditioning the application of the treaty.165 These methods are meant to allow for 
particularities between Member States as well as facilitate implementation into domestic 
practice.166 The U.S. has made use of these conditioning methods in the ratification of the 
ICCPR; it is these conditional methods that expose the underlying conflict between the 
U.S. conception of democratic sovereignty and subservience to international obligations. 
 
6.1.1 The Problem of Implementation 
The U.S. legal system, being a dualist system, conceives of domestic law and treaty law to 
be two different sets of law and domestic law is used to determine the status of 
international law in the courts.167 The “supremacy clause” in Article VI of the Constitution 
places ratified treaties on the same level as national legislation. This status equates federal 
law and treaty law, making them both the supreme law of the land. “When the two relate to 
the same subject, the courts will endeavour to construe them so as to give effect to both, if 
that can be done without violating the language of either; if the two are inconsistent, the 
one last in time will control the other, provided that the treaty on the subject is self-
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executing.”168 Barring any RUDs, this would mean that the ICCPR (after ratification) 
would be directly applicable in U.S. courts. 
 
The potential influence of treaty law is what lead to the U.S.’s conditional consent. The 
U.S. role in human rights activism, originally being one of leadership, significantly 
changed direction during the Eisenhower administration. During this time, Senator John 
Bricker (R-OH) initiated a series of proposed amendments to the Constitution which are 
collectively called the “Bricker Amendment.”169 The proposed effect of these amendments 
would be to alter the status of treaties so that they would become non-self-executing as a 
rule and thus have no direct impact.170 The main motivation behind these amendments 
(which were quite well supported in the Senate, though never reached the two-thirds 
majority required for passage) was to stop international law from perceived infringement 
on the democratic legitimacy of national domestic law. According to the U.S.’s conception, 
legitimacy of laws in a democracy come from the bottom-up, not from the top-down. It was 
fear of the UN and its human rights provisions which inspired this movement to reject 
international treaties as a legitimate source of law in American democracy.171 
 
The Bricker Amendment failed, most particularly due to John Foster Dulles (Secretary of 
State), who promised the Senate that the U.S. would not ratify the human rights treaties 
(ICCPR, CESCR specifically). Later that year, the State Department seemed to confirm the 
essence of the Bricker Amendment when it stated that: 
Treaties should be designed to promote United States interests by securing action 
by foreign governments in a way deemed advantageous to the United States. 
Treaties are not to be used as a device for the purpose of effecting internal social 
changes or to try to circumvent the constitutional procedures established in relation 
to what are essentially matters of domestic concern.172 
 
                                                 
168 Williams (1993)  p.44 emphasis mine 
169 see inter alia Bradley (2000) p.14 
170 see inter alia Bradley (2000) p.14 
171 Hannum (1993) p.14 
172 11 F.A.M. 700, 796 (State Department Circular No. 175) referenced in Hannum (1993) p.15  
 45
It wasn’t until the Carter administration (1977-1981) that human rights treaties entered into 
the political scene again. In 1978 President Carter submitted the ICCPR, CESCR, CERD 
and the ACHR to the Senate for advice and consent. However, the Senate did not vote on 
the Conventions at that time and the Regan administration did not show any interest in 
ratifying. The treaties were still pending before the Senate when George H. W. Bush 
brought the Conventions back into consideration along with a proposed package of RUDs.  
There were five direct reservations proposed to various rights within the ICCPR and 
several declarations of understanding.173 The Senate approved the ratification of just the 
ICCPR with the package of RUDs intact in April of 1992. 
 
The view of the Foreign Relations Committee in considering ratification was that ratifying 
the Covenant would not require any subsequent legislation.174 Where U.S. law seemed to 
be in direct conflict with the Covenant, reservations were put in place. The package of 
RUDs included a declaration of understanding which established the Covenant as non-self-
executing, meaning that the treaty is not directly enforceable as legislation nor as judicial 
precedent or guidelines. The package of RUDs, especially this last stipulation, was meant 
to render the Covenant powerless in relation to the domestic legislative and judicial 
systems.175  
6.1.2 Reasons for the RUDs 
The RUDs are meant to distance domestic law from international law and shelter the courts 
or legislature from the effects of the ICCPR. The source of this desire to isolate U.S. law 
from international law is the U.S.’s persistent affirmation of the legitimacy of its 
democratic decisions as not only being the only acceptable law, but also the core of 
American identity. The reasons for the RUDs overlap and inform one another, but can be 
separated into two general categories: legal and cultural. 
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6.1.2.1 Cultural Reasons for the RUDs 
The particular American experience is thought to be based on the successful democratic 
structure built by the founding fathers. The U.S. Constitution asserts American identity 
through its system of government and thus part of being “American” is believing and 
adhering to democratic principles: 
…this concern to ward off foreign influence is more than just a powerful state’s 
attempt to make the rules and exempt itself from them. The United States defines these 
exemptions in terms of the democratic legitimacy of its distinctive rights culture. The 
rights that Americans accept as binding are the ones written down in their own sacred 
texts and elaborated by their own courts and legislature. These rights, authored in the 
name of “we the people,” are anchored in the historical project of the American 
Revolution: a free people establishing a republic based in popular sovereignty…the 
United States is defending a mission, an identity, and a distinctive destiny as a free 
people.176  
In this way, politics molds the American consciousness. Democracy is an expression of the 
American way, and so is a good in and of itself.177 Contrastingly, international human 
rights are perceived to place government as the means to an end, the method by which 
human rights should be ensured.178 An implicit right to democracy may serve to alter this 
supposed distinction and perhaps help to bridge this schism. 
 
Some U.S. scholars suggest that Europe has more to gain from submitting their countries to 
supra-national instruments and bodies because they lack stability or faith in their domestic 
systems:179 “Their politics and their economies have indeed failed, and repair is to come 
from a transnational order.”180 The U.S., having its own perceived fidelity to human rights 
already within its Constitution, and having a history of successful political governance, has 
“…no similar perception of failure…and, therefore, no sense of a need to participate in the 
remedy.” 181 It seems the U.S. would do better, by way of maintaining its democratic 
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integrity, to go without international solutions to (what are conceived to be) national 
problems. 
 
The U.S.’s understanding of its special history is inseparable from its fidelity to democracy 
as both an assertion of internal identity (identity of the citizen) and external identity (the 
core of a world superpower). The democratic identity of the U.S. is prohibiting the 
acceptance of a limited sovereignty from the international regime of human rights.  
Any international infringement on sovereignty, or even the suggestion of it, is perceived as 
an insult to the power and prestige of the U.S. The U.S. also sees human rights as a 
particularly American concept and thus does not accept the validity of outside commentary 
on the content or objectives of issues tied to the U.S. Constitution (primarily the Bill of 
Rights). 
 
6.1.2.2 Legal Reasons for the RUDs 
The general legal perception is that the ICCPR formulation of rights is too vague and too 
broad. It is thought that the rights themselves leave considerable room for uncertainty in 
terms of scope and applicability.182 The natural response to this point is that the General 
Comments, Committee Reports, and jurisprudence of the HRC are adequate to define the 
rights in more particular terms. The U.S. however, has made it relatively clear, though not 
particularly explicit, that it does not consider the HRC to have “official interpretative 
authority over the ICCPR.”183 In particular, the U.S. has rejected the HRC’s stance on 
reviewing and passing judgement on RUDs. GC-24 (specifically directed at the U.S.) stated 
that it was within the power of the HRC to decide whether particular RUDs were 
compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty and if the RUDs were deemed 
inadmissible, the State Party is bound to the treaty without the benefit of the offending 
RUD. The U.S. has viewed the Covenant as particularly concerned with securing a high 
number of ratifications and therefore argues that the Covenant should be quite liberal in 
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allowing RUDs.184 With this mechanistic approach to the Covenant, the U.S.’s core 
assertion is that if a RUD is deemed to be incompatible with the treaty, then that RUD is 
not severable from the ratification of the treaty, and thus the treaty would then no longer be 
applicable to the State Party.185 This argument affords the U.S. an upper-hand in all 
dealings with the Covenant. The seemingly incompatible or offending RUDs should, by 
this argument, be seen through the lens of quantitatively gaining ratification, and without 
the RUD that gain is lost. The U.S. then has not only set the rules for the game, but also 
threatens to leave if it doesn’t get things its own way. The U.S. is afraid it may disagree 
with the stance of the HRC on an issue and find itself abiding by conditions which it never 
intended to abide by and find itself tied to a legal obligation that would be completely 
without democratic merit. 
 
A second legal reason for rejecting a self-executing stance on the ICCPR is what Frank 
Michelman terms “integrity-anxiety” in which the U.S. judiciary is concerned with 
maintaining “stable, continuous, and legitimate” legal interpretation.186 Using a 
comparative approach to law through international standard setting or through 
jurisprudence from other nations would threaten the stability, and perhaps then the validity, 
of the U.S. system of laws. In addition to this, it is argued that U.S. judges generally find 
foreign law too liberal “…on issues like the death penalty, abortion, sentencing, and so 
on—and [these liberal attitudes] should be resisted as alien to the American 
mainstream.”187 In general then, there seems to be conflict between the values of the U.S. 
system versus other democratic states and international human rights norms.188 
 
These legal concerns follow from a genuine fear that international law will interfere with 
the sovereignty of the judicial decisions of U.S. courts. It seems that the particular nature of 
human rights, one claimed to be rooted in the universal dignity of the human person, is not 
considered a mitigating element in the consideration of American exceptionalism. 
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6.2 Concluding Remarks on the U.S. as a Leader and as an Outlier 
The U.S. does not see itself as so much of an exception to human rights norms in general, 
but rather as an exception to international human rights norms. The particular culture and 
history of the U.S. as a so-thought model of democracy informs the rejection of an honest 
approach to the ICCPR’s requirement of treaty implementation. It seems easy to paint the 
U.S.’s approach to international human rights law as arrogant, petulant, and hypocritical. 
However, it is perhaps more accurate to see its approach as an outgrowth of a particularly 
dated conception of democracy, and an insistent faith in, and aggressive reactionary 
protection of, that conception. The U.S. does not view international human rights and 
national democracy to be interconnected nor mutually interdependent and therefore finds 
no basis in fidelity to a universal definition of democratic standards.  
 
Still, is an attachment to Westphalian-like sovereignty and nation-specific moral claims 
really all that bad? The U.S. widely secures civil and political rights and has played a 
valued role on the international stage.189 The particularity of the U.S.’s belief in its own 
value as being one separate and apart from the rest of the world doesn’t seem to be an 
indication of a truly renegade outlier, but rather an indication of stubbornness and self-
righteousness. Is the harm in that so great? The cost benefit equation may best be put in this 
way:  
As a language of moral claims, human rights has gone global by going local, by 
establishing its universal appeal in local languages of dignity and freedom. As 
international human rights has developed and come of age, not much attention has 
been paid to this process of vernacularization. We must ask whether any of us would 
care much about rights if they were articulated only in universalist documents like the 
Universal Declaration, and whether, in fact, our attachment to these universals depends 
critically on our prior attachments to rights that are national, rooted in the traditions of 
a flag, a constitution, a set of founders, and a set of national narratives, religious and 
secular, that give point and meaning to rights. We need to think through the relation 
between national rights traditions and international standards, to see that these are not 
in the antithetical relation we suppose. American attachment to its own values is the 
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condition and possibility of its attachment to the universal, and it is only as the 
universal receives a national expression that it catches the heart and the conviction of 
citizens.190 
 
Recognizing an implicit right to democracy has the possibility of broadening the definition 
of democracy to bridge the gap between American attachment to its particular values and 
international human rights norms. However, the case for this looks grim. Just as the U.S. 
conception of democracy has dictated its resistance to international norms, so it seems 
equally likely that it will dictate the rejection of any more modern redefinition of 
democratic standards. The U.S. is dearly attached to its long history of successful 
democracy in contrast to the perceived democratic failures in Europe, it is this rich history 
that seems most detrimental to the possibility of securing true and honest implementation 
of international civil and political norms for the American citizenry. With the UN so 
persistently promoting democracy we are left to wonder if this is a case of having to be 
careful what you wish for, or instead, if the concept of an implicit right is able to gain 
traction, will it leave the U.S. to be the lone defender of a simplistic and archaic notion of a 
glorified right to vote? 
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7 Practical Considerations:  
Human Rights and Democracy in Norway 
7.1 Intro 
Nordic social values have structured and informed the Norwegian State and the laws 
governing that State. These social values partially stem from the Protestant Christian 
virtues espoused by Martin Luther. Though not the only structuring influences, these values 
played a role in the formulation of the Norwegian welfare state.191 Putting it rather 
simplistically, Lutheranism argues that the divine gospel induces one to help one’s 
neighbor.192 This eventually translated into government responsibilities through the 
secularization of religious ethics;193 the welfare state is tied strongly to the Norwegian 
conception of the moral good.194 
 
This welfare state mentality is seen also through legal principles and conceptions in 
Norway: 
A sense of solidarity and mutual dependence is part of legal understanding. Solidarity 
is not simply an ethical concept, but could be seen as a legal concept. Following the 
recognition (“Anerkennung”) we speak of people recognizing each other both as right-
holders an as subjects in need of care and welfare, that is, as beneficiaries of social 
rights. The social contract, accordingly, recognizes the differences between us in our 
need for care and protection, but at the same time affirms our equality. We may then 
argue that it makes sense to speak of the Nordic social model as a general cultural 
foundation on which the law is built.195 
This sense of solidarity has a communitarian tinge. While there is strong protection of 
individual interests, there has typically been less focus on individualized rights due to the 
fact that they seem divisive.196  
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This sense is coupled with a long-standing trust in the Norwegian government as the 
protector of the people.197 There is a distinct air of State-friendliness198 with which the 
State functions as a paternalistic figure rather than a functionary of a Hobbesian like social-
contract. This is markedly at odds with the protective model of democracy commonly held 
by nations outside of the Scandinavia.199 The protective model sees democratic functioning 
as the shield wielded by the citizenry against a possibly intrusive State hostile to the 
interests of the individual.200 Democracy in Norway does note seek to encroach on State 
power but rather simply to influence it.201 This is shown, inter alia, through the value 
democratic governance has in legal legitimacy: 
There is little doubt that Nordic courts usually judge in line with the ruling majority, 
making the judge more of a civil servant than an independent actor. In Nordic legal 
doctrine, one finds the fear of an overly independent judiciary that may jeopardize 
democratically enacted legislation regularly expressed.202 
However, in recent literature concerning the status of Norwegian democracy this role of the 
court as a civil servant has waned with the erosion of Norwegian democracy and the 
process of judicialization.203  
 
7.2 The Problem of Implementation 
Norway was one of the original signatories to the ECHR. It was widely held that 
Norwegian law already secured the rights within the Convention and, with what Martin 
Scheinin calls “Nordic arrogance,” believed that Norway would serve as a standard-setting 
model to other nations attempting to implement the obligations of the Convention.204 There 
was originally one reservation made on Art.9 concerning Norwegian policy towards 
Jesuits, but the Constitution was amended concerning this discrepancy and the reservation 
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was subsequently removed.205 There was some consideration of whether Art.32 of the 
Convention concerning whether the competence of the Committee of Ministers would 
conflict with Art.1 of the Norwegian Constitution stating that “…the Kingdom of [Norway] 
is a free, independent, indivisible and inalienable realm.”206 This contention however was 
rejected by the Storting and the ECHR ratification was approved without any further 
concerns regarding implementation.  
 
Norwegian law also follows a dualist system in which international treaty is not 
immediately implemented into domestic law without action by the legislature. Because of 
the perceived compatibility between Norwegian law and the ECHR, the Convention was 
approached through the method of passive transformation.207 This approach generally 
excluded much of the judicial consideration of the ECHR from domestic law interpretation. 
It wasn’t until the 1980s and 1990s that the ECHR provisions began to be taken into 
account in administrative and judicial decision-making.208 At this time, Norwegian courts 
clearly preferred to use the ECHR as a reference point for their decisions:  
From an analytical point of view, this establishment of conformity of domestic law 
with the Convention may undoubtedly be regarded as a direct application of the 
Convention, because the Convention in such cases has formed an integrated part of the 
Court’s reasoning. In other words, the Convention has been applied as a source of 
law.209 
In addition to this, the courts were also explicitly referencing the Strasbourg decisions and 
using them to revise their own case law.210 Thus the approach of passive transformation 
bled a bit more actively into the judicial system than originally thought necessary. 
 
Taking note of this increasingly influential role of the ECHR on domestic legal practice, 
Art.110c was inserted into the Norwegian Constitution in 1994. It required the authorities 
of the State to “…respect and ensure [international] human rights” and that “[p]rovisions 
                                                 
205 Jensen (1992) p.33 
206 Jensen (1992) p.33 
207 inter alia Scheinin (2008) p.136-137 
208 Scheinin (2008) p.139 
209 Jensen (1992) p.107 
210 Jensen (1992) p.158 
 54
on the implementation of treaties on human rights shall be prescribed through Law.”211 
This Article was considered to be the “…legitimation of the competence of Norwegian 
courts to apply the ECHR and other human rights treaties even if they formally were 
outside the domestic legal order.”212 
 
This legitimation was taken further in the 1999 Human Rights Act. This Act gave the 
ECHR (as well as the ICCPR and CESCR) the legal status of domestic law and specified 
that if there were conflicts between other domestic laws and the Conventions, the 
Conventions would take precedence.213 Passive transformation was then discontinued and 
the ECHR became applicable in the courts and became a direct consideration for the 
drafting of new legislation. The courts of Norway now use the Conventions included in the 
HRA1999 directly.  For example, before the case of Folgerø and Others v. Norway was 
referred to the ECtHR, the Norwegian courts used a combination of the provisions of the 
ECHR and the ICCPR as well as case law from the ECtHR and precedent from the HRC to 
decide the case at the national level.214   
 
7.3 Human Rights in Norwegian Law 
Traditionally the role of the Norwegian courts was to support the decisions of the 
legislature, the legislature being the democratic organ and thus the most legitimate decision 
making body.215 However, the 1999 Human Rights Act216 brought a strengthening of the 
courts which has generally been referred to as judicialization: 
Some experts have seen this development as a risk to democracy, while other meet it 
with satisfaction as an element in the transition to a European conception of rights 
were genuine individual rights have a recognized special (higher) status among sources 
of law. Some say that the growing role of the courts means that the judiciary is 
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obtaining more and more political power, while others think that what is moving is the 
dividing line between politics and law.217 
Partially the concern is that the dictates of international law are not always clear or well 
enumerated and the ECHR in particular has evolving standards which leads the 
implementation of the obligations to be one in which courts seem to have a particularly 
legislative-like role.218 
 
Still, with the Norwegian Lutheran history and a strong conception and perpetuation of the 
welfare state in combination with the so-called Nordic arrogance mentioned earlier, one 
may assume that Norway would be comfortable with instating international human rights 
norms into domestic law. Norway has made it clear that human rights are a cornerstone of 
government policy and that that it is the spearhead of developments within the field of 
human rights.219 However despite all this, Norway is not comfortable and international 
human rights obligations causes several concerns for the State. The problem of 
implementation and judicialization is a two-tiered attack on Norway’s self-perception. The 
first tier is the already addressed problem of democratic legitimacy. Historically the role of 
the judiciary was to affirm and implement the legislation of the democratic majority, now 
the judiciary is taking precedent from outside the nation to dictate the aspects of the social 
welfare state, which Norway views with pride as part of its own particular character. It was 
the original belief that Norway would be the model to the rest of the world, not the one 
being molded. The second tier of this problem is that international human rights are 
constructed in a protectionist manner in which individualism is strongly guarded against 
State interference. This goes against the solidarity aspect of Norwegian self-identification: 
“The New and strengthened role of individual rights has contributed towards a certain 
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individualistic tendency that can be seen as alien to the Nordic ‘social democratic’ or 
egalitarian ideology.”220 
 
Norway’s focus and identity is related to the social welfare system of the State. The 
secularized moral values of the Lutheran tradition, contributing to an egalitarian system 
with strong bonds of solidarity, are also interwoven into democratic legitimacy.  If this 
system, whose self-conception is one of a strong protector of human rights at home, and a 
valuable promoter of human  rights abroad,221 takes issue with international norms 
infringing on national democratic space, then what is to be said for the interdependence 
between international human rights and democracy? The recently conducted study on 
Makten og Demokratiet unequivocally claims that Norway’s democracy is eroding, and 
one of the many reasons for this erosion is the judicialization process in relation to human 
rights.222 Norway, despite being predisposed to a human rights mentality and being, 
comparatively, accepting of international norms, faces very similar issues to the U.S. in this 
regard. If one of few successful welfare States in the world cannot seem to bridge the 
conceptual gap between democracy and human rights protection and promotion, what then 
can we expect from others? 
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8 Conclusion 
 
Democracy and human rights are strengthened and validated in connection with one 
another. The first part of the thesis shows that the core standards, the necessary institutions, 
and the current trends of democracy can be found in codified human rights standards and 
developments in the human rights field. The scope of these standards can then be defined 
and secured with a legal balance between the needs of society and the rights of the 
individual. The study has shown that particular consideration of the needs of a democratic 
society is not necessary for human rights and democracy to be intertwined and 
interdependent—it is a natural union. Human rights are validated in democratic theory in 
that a democratic polity is the most assured way to implement and protect human rights, it 
is logically consistent with the combined requirements of the provisions of the 
Conventions, and it is the most consistent expression of the ability to claim rights.223 
 
The practical problem seems to lie in the internationalization of human rights. Democracy 
is naturally an assertion of national Westphalian-like sovereignty in that it, when viewed in 
a less-holistic sense, reserves legitimacy for internal decision-making. The international 
aspect of the human rights regime subverts this sovereignty to stipulations of the 
international legal system. If human rights were universal norms in the operable sense, then 
internationalization wouldn’t matter very much; national human rights norms would be the 
same across the board. However, for obvious reasons this is not the case and the UN and 
the CoE have served as mediating bodies in this regard. In this system some aspect of 
sovereignty is sacrificed by the nation when it ratifies human rights documents.224 In the 
case of both the U.S. and of Norway, neither originally perceived or wanted their 
ratification to affect their sovereignty: the U.S. rejected the validity of ICCPR influence on 
national norms, and Norway believed it had already implemented the requirements of the 
ECHR.  
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 The concept of an emerging right to democracy runs into the problem of sovereignty in 
terms of U.N. Charter Art.2.7. The human rights regime has already established routes into 
the sovereignty of nations through requirements of obligations to citizens and through 
monitoring of such obligations. These routes, though admittedly limited in potency, can be 
used to help deal with this problem in regards to democratization. However, this argument 
becomes muddled when it is shown that human rights, even for the nations who strongly 
support them in theory, are practically problematic in their relation to democratic 
legitimacy.  
 
It is important to place these conceptual issues in context. No theory works out perfectly in 
practice, and in international issues the most common and probably unavoidable approach 
to developing trends is a patchwork of motivations, policies, and pressures. Additionally, it 
is important to note that the human rights regime has made immense headway during the 
past 60 years and continues at a good pace. So despite this legitimacy gap, human rights are 
intertwined with an underlying or intrinsic right to democracy and their power and 
legitimacy should not be overlooked or undervalued. It seems that no matter what, the push 
towards democracy is going to run into the wall of State sovereignty. Human rights are 
valuable in their ongoing process of redefining sovereignty and in their ability to flush out 
the definition of democracy in a way that is more accurate and logically legitimate than the 
available alternatives.  
 
The U.S.’s drive to remake the Middle East225 and Norway’s new move to obstruct a 
comprehensive Optional Protocol to CESCR226 are just some of the signs of the backlash 
that fidelity to democracy can bring. Still, as discussed in the country studies, it is not an 
all-or-nothing equation. Democracy and human rights gain traction at the national level 
when they are directly couched in terms of country-specific values, and this is neither 
wrong nor is it (on its own) harmful. The human rights players must resist the urge to move 
                                                 
225 Apodaca (2006) p.165-189 
226 Langford (2008) 
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too quickly or too absolutely into the sphere of sovereignty in this regard. The U.S. is in a 
far more resistant position than Norway. The U.S.’s outright resistance to international 
commentary on national legal issues leaves no room for maneuvering. Norway has made 
room for international obligations and influence and so is somehow swept up into the 
progressive understandings of international human rights law whether it wants to be or not. 
 
It is without doubt that democracy is an integral part of the goals of the UN and the CoE, 
and is the best system of government for securing human rights. However, due diligence 
must be paid to the tensions between democratic decision-making on a national level, and 
human rights obligations on an international level. Democracy carries the dangers of over-
simplification and over-nationalization. A human-rights-based approach will work against 
these dangers by broadening the definition and requirements of democracy through 
exposing its more holistic nature, and shall do so in the years to come, but is clearly not a 
catch-all fix. Rather human rights are a dynamic player in this new field and should have a 
strong role in the emerging conceptions of the definition and requirements of democracy in 
the decades to come.  
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